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Abstract 
This article seeks to provide a template for understanding the tragic dimension of Theodor W. 
Adorno’s philosophy through a reading of his early collaborative work with Max Horkheimer, the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944). While Adorno’s view has often been considered to be tragic, 
little has been done to reconstruct the tragic dimension of his thought. I argue that the view of the 
human condition, presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, is founded on metaphysical, 
epistemological, and ethical convictions that have structural similarities with the positions held by 
theorists and philosophers of tragedy and the tragic. Since traces of these tragic elements can be 
found throughout Adorno’s mature philosophy, the approach presented in this article may serve as a 
model for a more detailed mapping and examination of the tragic dimension of his thought in future 
research. 
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Although his view of the human condition is composed in an unmistakably tragic key, Theodor 
Adorno never wrote an explicit theory of tragedy or of the aesthetic genre of tragedy.1 Throughout 
his oeuvre one finds critical remarks on issues related to tragic works of art and philosophical views 
on issues that bear similarities to the ways they have been dealt with in both tragedies and the vast 
secondary literature on the tragic.2 The latter rings especially true in the case of his early 
collaborative work, the Dialectic of Enlightenment (with Horkheimer), which sets the scene for 
Adorno’s subsequent inquiries into the nature of modernity and the human condition. 
 Adorno and Horkheimer’s view of the human condition can be considered tragic along 
metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical planes. First, the world we inhabit is horrifying in its 
hostility, a conceit seemingly beyond our control. This leads us to seek power and influence through 
domination, rendering traditional means of accruing knowledge corrupt as far as they only serve 
this purpose, which ultimately turns against humanity. There are no transcendental meanings, 
thereby putting us in a position where we have to fashion our moral and ethical conduct with little 
hope of understanding this predicament in terms that are not understood as domination. Without 
recourse to a concealed meaning, we are left with a bleak depiction of a world that is neither fully 
comprehensible to human agency nor under its control.3 This kind of world is not only something 
human beings act upon but also one that acts upon them, thereby rendering it unaccommodating to 
our rational and moral ambitions.4 In Horkheimer and Adorno’s narrative the world is beset with 
fear causing humans to seek subjectivity accessed through the domination of others. This has 
overturned human progress while displacing the main source of suffering from nature to society, 
thereby leaving us with the ethical responsibility to organize social relations in an effort to prevent 
the re-emergence of barbarism. 
 In what follows, I will apply a tragic reading of Dialectic of Enlightenment, which will serve 
as a template for a similar reading of Adorno’s mature philosophy.5 The article’s three subsections 
are structured around the themes of fear, knowledge, and morality, which are analyzed in light of 
existing theories of tragedy, some of which may have influenced Adorno. The third subsection 
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includes an analysis of Adorno’s reading of Hamlet, which is his most sympathetic philosophical 
analysis of a tragic work of art.6 I will conclude with a brief summary of Adorno’s scattered 
remarks on tragedy and the tragic, especially those found in his Aesthetic Theory, while echoing the 
tragic reading of the Dialectic of Enlightenment laid out in the preceding sections. 
 
Fear, Subjectivity, and Reason 
Horkheimer and Adorno begin their book by presenting a genealogy of modern reason from the 
perspective of a troubled relationship with nature.7 This essentially hubristic relationship has all the 
elements of tragedy, insofar as humanity is unable to understand nature other than as an object of 
domination, aims only to gain knowledge that aids in its control and domestication, and therefore 
prevents the formation of ethically sustainable relationships between human beings with nature and 
one another.8 This narrative provides the grounds for Adorno’s tragic view of humanity and 
culture⎯the human condition as determined by social forces. This view persists in all of Adorno’s 
subsequent elaborations on culture and morality and is therefore worth exploring at length. The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment’s argument could be summarized thus: Human beings seeks to curb their 
fear of nature by attempting to control it, initially with magic and ultimately with science. These 
attempts fail as science reverts into myth, and external nature, subjected to control and domination, 
is extended to overlap with human nature. 
 The authors argue that myth is already enlightenment, insofar as it is an attempt to control 
nature, even when it is done in an unsystematic and non-rational way, such as through the 
utilization of ritual magic.9 In Homeric poetry, myths are systematized into a mythology, forming a 
primeval form of enlightenment, which is then transformed into the first systematic and 
comprehensive formalization of the principles of reason in Plato. According to this view, 
philosophy is about power and control and is defined as having a privative relation to literature, 
which for Plato meant tragic poetry.10 This signature, characteristic of Platonic philosophy, can be 
seen in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment as the fear of a murky, undivided 
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entity worshipped as the principle of mana in the earliest known stages of western civilization. 
“Primal and undifferentiated, it is everything unknown and alien; it is that which transcends the 
bounds of experience, the part of things which is more than their immediately perceived existence” 
(10). This means that the move from magic to philosophy signifies an attempt to replace the 
intuitions of the particular with the principles of the universal as the source and guarantor of 
knowledge.11 As a consequence, philosophy can be seen as an attempt to colonize the principle of 
mana in order to curb the primeval fear that keeps humanity from fulfilling its emancipatory 
potential: “The doubling of nature into appearance and essence, effect and force, made possible by 
myth no less than by science, springs from human fear, the expression of which becomes its 
explanation” (11). 
 The juxtaposition of myth and science is crucial to Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument, 
according to which enlightenment is not simply a modern ideological construction that seeks to 
justify the superiority of the natural sciences in the process of eradicating myths. Instead, it is a 
complex process of control and domination that, paradoxically, also has a liberating effect and 
seems to be the only means we have for surpassing our animal nature. Only through enlightenment 
were people able to move from tribal and rural communities to the rationally organized democratic 
polis. Yet this emancipatory program is not as thoroughly rational as it seems to be, since the 
attempt to eradicate primal fear is never completely successful. In fact, enlightenment is blind to or 
neglectful of the fear around which it constitutes itself, and the attempts to overcome fear solely 
through rational means inadvertently radicalizes it. Against the erratic “outside,” reason posits unity 
in an attempt to force everything into an all-encompassing rational system deduced from the 
subject: “Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the ‘outside’ is the real source 
of fear” (11). Such a system accepts no ambiguity and seeks total control of the image it creates, 
which serves as its justification. In other words, the primary function of science is ideological: 
“Through their claim to universal validity, the philosophical concepts with which Plato and 
Aristotle represented the world elevated the conditions, which those concepts justified to the status 
5 
 
of true reality” (16). Thus Philosophy, the first science, is in its formal instantiation the science of 
the polis, that is, moral and political philosophy. The key themes of Athenian philosophy deal with 
the ways we should live our lives and organize our societies while inadvertently trying to justify the 
existing order by utilizing the concepts originating from “the marketplace of Athens.”12 As Adorno 
writes much later in Aesthetic Theory: 
  
 Social struggles and the relations of classes are imprinted in the structure of art works; by 
contrast, the political positions deliberately adopted by artworks are epiphenomena and 
usually impinge on the elaboration of works and thus, ultimately, on their social truth 
content. Political opinions count for little. It is possible to argue over how much Attic 
tragedy, including those by Euripides, took part in the violent social conflicts of the epoch; 
however, the basic tendency of tragic form, in contrast to its mythical subjects, the 
dissolution of the spell of fate and the birth of subjectivity, bears witness as much to social 
emancipation from feudal familial ties as, in the collision between mythical law and 
subjectivity, to the antagonism between fateful domination and a humanity awakening to 
maturity. That this antagonism, as well as the historicophilosophical tendency, became an 
apriori of form rather than being treated simply as thematic material, endowed tragedy with 
its social substantiality: Society appears in it all the more authentically the less it is the 
intended object.13 
 
The complex relationship between literature and philosophy, morality and politics, the personal and 
the social, and ideology and experience are themes penetrating both philosophy and tragedy. They 
are both forms of discourse that strive to enable Athenian citizens to come to terms with the newly 
developed democratic form of urban living; the demands it sets on the organization of life around 
the rules and laws that enable and uphold the state; and the persistent failure of reason in enabling 
human beings to fulfill their moral ambitions.14 
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 In Dialectic of Enlightenment, the criticism of reason and the attacks on the Platonic attempt 
to subject people to rational control of each other and of themselves is often presented as a criticism 
of myth.15 A good example is the famous reading of The Odyssey, which for Horkheimer and 
Adorno tells the story of how Odysseus secularized the primeval world by measuring it out (38).16 
According to their reading, the way Odysseus resists the temptation of the Sirens by having his 
body bound to the mast while retaining the ability to listen to their song, effectively allows him to 
control nature by controlling the natural in him, by violently suppressing his animal nature. 
Odysseus’s act both violates his own nature and establishes his domination over his fellowmen in a 
process that has been neatly summarized by Paul Connerton: “He must forcibly restrain his 
instinctual drives (he is bound to the mast); and he must face obedience upon those who travel with 
him (they must row), which in turn is only possible because he deludes them (he plugs their 
ears).”17 
 For Horkheimer and Adorno, The Odyssey depicts the founding act of the bourgeois self. 
This paradigmatic modern subject denies its natural grounds in order to gain autonomy. Yet its 
knowledge remains limited, because the process of instrumentalization that allows the repression of 
nature requires reason to lose its self-awareness in order to become “hard enough to shatter myths” 
(2). The loss of self-awareness leads to the denial of our dependence on nature and, as a result, our 
inability to recognize and understand our instinctual animal drives.18 Without taking these aspects 
of our being into account, all our attempts to control our lives are bound to fail. This launches the 
kind of trajectory illustrated by the fates of tragic protagonists from Oedipus to Lear. 
 Horkheimer and Adorno want to remind us that while we like to think of ourselves as 
rational and autonomous individuals, human nature is much more complex, even horrific. 
Subjectivity is only gained through an essentially violent act of repression. Before Odysseus 
sacrifices his true nature in order to gain bourgeois subjectivity, he is more akin to the complex 
protagonists of tragedies than the essentially rational beings completely in control of their choices 
and destinies presupposed by enlightened systems of thought.19 As an autonomous and heroic 
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individual cunningly overcoming the forces of nature, Odysseus becomes the beau idéal of an 
enlightened subject. As the harbinger of a rational order, he stands on the threshold between the 
world of myth and the world of the polis, a transitionary period the anxieties of which the Attic 
tragedies illustrate. The tragic protagonists inhabit a seemingly rationally organized society, but 
they constantly fail in their attempt to organize their own actions through the same means that 
enabled that social organization to come about. On an individual level, the type of instrumental 
reason Plato relied on in his search for emancipatory potential was not enough to deliver humans 
from the power of those evils that prevented them from attaining the good life. 
 As the classicist Jean-Pierre Vernant reminds us, the tragic protagonist is no longer an 
idealized model, unlike the mythical characters that occasionally appear in tragedies, but a 
problem.20 This problem is debated by the chorus, comprised of amateur actors, who 
dramaturgically and theatrically represent the citizens of the polis.21 According to Vernant, the 
conflict between the individual and the community, the citizen and the polis, is echoed in the very 
juxtaposition of the chorus and the tragic protagonist. The former is “an anonymous and collective 
being whose role is to express, through its fears, hopes, and judgments, the feelings of the spectators 
who make up the civic community,” and it is opposed by “the individualized figure whose action 
forms the center of the drama and who is seen as a hero from another age, always more or less alien 
to the ordinary condition of a citizen.”22 As individualized as the protagonist is, he is always bound 
to his community in a number of ways and it would be hubristic to think otherwise.23 
 For a philosopher of the tragic, this has two important consequences. On the one hand, it 
represents the individual’s surrender to the rule of law, thereby legitimizing the rationally oriented 
organization of the polis.24 The civic order of the polis is, after all, a rational construct.25 Its purpose 
is to provide citizens with a framework for acting responsibly, thereby surpassing the mythological 
order of the gods, whose unpredictability echoes that of an allegedly hostile nature.26 As such, 
thought becomes the tool of control and domination of both nature and people. Nature effectively 
comes to mean everything excluded from the realm of the polis, and human beings become citizens 
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once they are subjected to abstract rules and norms, implemented from without.27 On the other 
hand, the emerging role of tragedy in Athenian society put the inherent contradictions of the polis 
on public display.28 Since this was done through artistic means, it inspired later thinkers to see the 
polis as a singular unity of aesthetics, politics, and morality.29 As J. M. Bernstein has noted, in 
modernity these concepts are seen as three distinct domains and as result of this strict separation, art 
has lost its social and political relevance.30 Several attempts have been made to counteract this 
aesthetic alienation by recouping art’s sociological significance. Some of these ventures failed to 
gain the required momentum, as was the case with Richard Wagner’s ambitious Gesamtkunstwerk, 
while others have turned out to be monstrous, such as the fascist aestheticizing of politics.31 
 Yet the need and aspiration of reclaiming the social function of art lives on in the aesthetic 
criticism of modernity, to which tradition Adorno clearly belongs. In art, Horkheimer and Adorno 
argue, the whole appears in the particular (14). The work of art thus reveals to us an image of 
society with its conflicting interrelations of power, thereby bringing within our reach the 
disconnected limitations reason imposes on our being. This idea, first outlined in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, becomes even more evident in Adorno’s later work. Throughout his writing Adorno 
retains the hope that art can expose the inherent contradictions of modern culture. Whether this 
could ever help to liberate us from the repressive confines of the dialectic of enlightenment is 
unclear, but it is certainly an essential part of the process. This hope seems to have far-reaching 
implications not only for art and aesthetic theory but can also be applied to Adorno’s understanding 
of the “good life.” In order to address the moral dimension of Adorno’s thought, however, we need 
to first understand what the curious interplay of art and reason can reveal about our ability to gain 
knowledge of and mastery over our lives. Insofar as the true nature of our humanity is denied by the 
very reason we have accepted, on a cultural level, as the sole means for its assessment, we need to 
find a new way of thinking, that can transcend reason. This position is tragic in a very basic sense: 
the theoretical attempts to understand our predicament are always bound to fail since reason is 
9 
 
implicated in causing it. Additionally, as we have seen, the modern rational subject is defined, like 
so many tragic heroes, by a lack of self-awareness.32 
 
Aesthetic Truth 
In terms of social and cultural organization, the transition from the rural world to that of the polis 
was effectively an attempt to move from a mythical order to an enlightened rational order. And as 
classicists such as Jean-Pierre Vernant and philosophers such as Andrew Bowie have suggested, on 
the level of cultural self-understanding this transition was mediated through the theatre.33 As Bowie 
has pointed out, art was the only cultural form that could combine “the affective, the ethical and the 
cognitive.”34 In this way tragedy served a civic purpose in the budding Greek polis in which what 
has since become known as the scientific, the aesthetic, the moral, and the political simultaneously 
kept each other in dialectical check. As these forms became increasingly institutionalized and the 
polis secured its role as the accepted mode of social organization, this dynamic interrelationship 
stagnated and philosophy came to dominate the public discourse.35 
 Plato, the best-known exponent of this new political and ideological order, sought in the 
Republic to cement the position of philosophy as the only legitimate mode of discourse on social 
and political issues.36 Thus, in the course of his argument, he acknowledges that he is participating 
in “an ancient quarrel” between poetry and philosophy.37 The mere existence of a quarrel implies 
that the two discourses share the same objective, that is, that the dispute has to do with a conflict 
between two competing modes of discourse regarding social, political, moral, and aesthetic matters. 
The presence of mythical figures and tropes in Attic tragedy signifies that it belongs to a phase of 
transition, or, as Adorno argues, tragedy becomes obsolete once this transition is completed and the 
polis becomes stable enough to discard the past.38 This lays the groundwork for the triumph of 
enlightenment that has come to dominate the trajectory of western cultural and political formations 
to the present day. The demise of tragedy is part of a rationalization process, which allows the 
domain of philosophy to be purged of everything that does not fit into an enlightened conception of 
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knowledge.39 This rationalization entails the eradication of the concrete through “the determining 
negation of whatever is directly at hand” and the subsumption of the particular under the universal, 
“which subdues the abundance of qualities” (20, 6). 
 In the new enlightened order, “the clean separation between science and poetry,” equates 
philosophy with reason and associates tragic poetry with myth (12–13).40 This separation provides a 
starting point for the entire tradition of philosophy that shows a special interest in the aesthetic.41 I 
referred to this tradition earlier as that of the aesthetic criticism of modernity, since it values the 
subversive potential of art against the rationalist and scientific ideology of western culture. 
Horkheimer and Adorno mention these tendencies with a reference to Schelling, whom they 
paraphrase as having said “art begins where knowledge leaves humans in the lurch” (14). The role 
of science is then to explain the unique ability of art to record and communicate. Yet this potential 
of art is grounded in the type of knowledge bourgeois culture seeks to dismiss as irrational and 
irrelevant. Thus, whenever some sort of concession regarding the power of reason has been made, 
more room has been given to religious faith rather than to art.42 The power of the aesthetic lies in its 
ostensible ability to bypass rational conceptualization without setting itself into a privative 
relationship with reason (14). One of the ways art does this is through ambiguity, that is, by 
pointing outside the representation of reality, which enlightened reason mistakes for reality itself. 
Later in his career, Adorno chose to call this projection “identity thinking,” and his criticism of it 
could be seen as an attempt to sublate the division between philosophy and poetry.43 
 Art, which, unlike reason, has no difficulty in dealing with particulars, needs reason for 
interpreting artworks, while reason needs art to reveal its limitations.44 This idea, I think, is central 
to Adorno’s aesthetic theory.45 The dynamic of art and reason reiterates the complex relationship of 
myth and reason presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. As we have seen, Horkheimer and 
Adorno see the separation of myth and reason as misguided, insofar as myths had already served a 
purpose similar to the one later ascribed to philosophy: “Myth sought to report, to name, to tell of 
origins⎯but therefore also to narrate, record, explain. This tendency was reinforced by the 
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recording and collecting of myths. From a record, they soon became a teaching” (5). Yet as a means 
of sociocultural instruction, the collection of myths forms a whole that can be subjected to 
enlightened rational inquiry. Once their rationalization has been accomplished, in a process that 
turns myth into a rational account and reason into myth, myths need to justify their role as a 
teaching tool.46 This justification, however, can only be conducted within the domain of reason, 
using the strategies provided by philosophy. This sets philosophy apart from and against poetry and 
masks the mythic and poetic qualities of philosophical discourse. The tradition of aesthetic criticism 
sees this Platonic quarrel as prefiguring the rupture that became constitutive of modernity, namely, 
the separation of the domains of philosophical inquiry into truth, morality, and the beautiful.47 
 In modernity, the domain of truth becomes almost synonymous with philosophy, making it 
necessary for all inquiries into truth, morality, and art to be philosophically validated in order to be 
considered scientific. The problem is that the dominant method of philosophical inquiry sets serious 
limitations on our capacity to understand our human condition: we are forced to conduct our 
inquiries by relying on a mode of thought that is fully complicit with the regressive socio-economic 
system known as capitalism. Since the myth of scientific impartiality dominates the discourses of 
knowledge and politics, the notion of beauty is associated with subjective taste. Subjective qualities 
are by definition considered to be beyond the reach of universal categories and therefore beyond 
rational examination, for science does not recognize particulars. Still, the association of beauty with 
taste contains at least a grain of truth: since taste is a matter of individual preference, the association 
inadvertently hints at the presence of the particular in aesthetic experience.48 The notion of the 
particular is pivotal to Adorno’s thought.49 In fact, one possible way of reformulating the core idea 
of Adorno’s ethics is to consider it as a demand to respect the particular, which the enlightenment 
has sought to deny or even eradicate.50 The category of the aesthetic, with its unique ability to 
communicate without recourse to the traditional corrupt means of communication, enables the 
bridging of truth and morality. This moral dimension of Adorno’s aesthetic theory conveys another 
aspect of his affinity with the philosophers of the tragic. Although disagreeing with their 
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conclusions, Adorno seems to address some of the problems that troubled Arthur Schopenhauer and 
Friedrich Nietzsche, two notable philosophers of the tragic.51 
 In this regard, the most important aspect of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is the 
epistemological value he grants to art: “literature objectifies the Idea of humanity,” he states, and 
tragedy is “the pinnacle of literature.”52 As Bowie explains, tragedy depicts situations brought about 
by “the ‘excess’ of the world” that challenge our forms of knowledge.53 Denying the failure of our 
reason to exhaust reality, we seek to maintain an illusion of true knowledge about and complete 
mastery of the natural. This illusion causes us to adopt a nihilist world-view and to commit horrific 
acts that appear as rational and morally unquestionable. This is so because the true object of our 
actions, available to us as the excess, is not within our conceptual reach and we are therefore 
constantly at risk of ignoring its existence.54 For Schopenhauer tragedy, and tragedy alone, is able to 
reveal the world that lies beyond the level of representation, beyond ideology. This world is a world 
of perennial suffering, brought about by the metaphysical drive that moves it and is indifferent to 
our individual desires, the will. Having understood and accepted that suffering is an unavoidable 
dimension of our existence, we are better off abandoning our attempts to seek solace through futile 
attempts to make the world meet the subjective needs of the will. Doing away with subjectivity 
brings forth autonomy and objectivity. This happens in aesthetic experience, making art a condition 
for knowledge.55 
 Taking his cue from Schopenhauer, the young Nietzsche also saw tragedy as a way to 
contemplate the grounds of our very existence. He defined these grounds as a quasi-deterministic 
primal force guiding our actions.56 This force resembles the aforementioned principle of mana in 
that both are horrendous and unbearable when faced as such. According to Nietzsche, one of the 
functions of the thin veneer of civilization is to keep the force at bay. This inability to embrace the 
totality of life, by denying its grounds, is a defining feature of our decadent and nihilist modern 
culture. Nietzsche thought that Greeks saw things differently. They allowed the aesthetic 
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contemplation of the Dionysian horror by putting the force on public display in tragedy, thereby 
affirming life as a whole.57 
 Adorno’s formulations of the function of art, the birth of philosophy, and the relationship of 
the identical and the non-identical clearly contain vestiges of Nietzschean and Schopenhauerian 
notions of the tragic. Both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche agree that there is something wrong with 
scientific attempts to uncover the truth about the human predicament. If anything, such attempts 
prevent us from reaching the truth, only allowing us to pursue a truncated form of existence. This 
view resembles the aforementioned analysis of The Odyssey presented in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.58 While Adorno rejects the Schopenhauerian ideas of the necessity of suffering and 
individual liberation as well as the Nietzschean attraction to irrationalism and his hope of aesthetic 
reconciliation, he agrees with both on the ability of art to reveal something essential about 
ourselves, something modern bourgeois science is unable to grasp. Horkheimer and Adorno share 
the Schopenhauerian view that the grounds of our being are horrifying and that the primal horror 
this creates is sublimated through magic and ritual, the modern after-image of which is art. 
Additionally, they agree with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche that there is more to life than reason can 
grasp. Finally, they seem to share with Nietzsche, among other things, a belief in the necessity to 
supplement the enlightened conception of the world with an affirmation of the aesthetic. 
 Adorno believes, then, that works of art provide valid information about the world around 
us.59 He argues that they do so by reflecting and reproducing the conditions of the socio-historical 
processes to which they belong while simultaneously managing to say something that applies to the 
entire human condition.60 Art is mediated by history and society, which burdens the artwork with an 
internal tension that mirrors the tensions constitutive of modern societies.61 Works of art thus 
communicate an epochal self-consciousness, which communicates the truth about the specific 
historical situation that affects us all within the sphere of western capitalism. Art can therefore serve 
a function similar to that which tragedy is believed to have served in and for the polis. This enables 
the aesthetic to act as a corrective to the one-sidedness of enlightenment rationality, with art serving 
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the moral function of reminding us of our duty to live responsibly and to ensure that all avoidable 
suffering, both human and non-human, is indeed avoidable. But Adorno, unlike his romantic 
predecessors Wagner and the young Nietzsche, does not advocate a unilateral aesthetic 
reconciliation of culture.62 His negativism insinuates that we should abstain from utopian idealism 
and instead understand the convergence of the aesthetic and the epistemological as a moral demand 
in a tragic key.63 
 
Tragic Morality 
We have seen how the critique of reason and myth presented in the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
reclaims the aesthetic in critiquing society from a moral standpoint.64 While the object of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s criticism is modernity, their position is complicated by their tracing the 
history of the dialectic⎯that functions both as the object and the starting point of the critique⎯all 
the way back to the primeval human condition, thereby emphasizing an intricate relationship 
between past and present.65 Modernity is best understood, they argue, as denoting a socio-historical 
formation in which an attempt to dominate nature and replace the myths of earlier eras has 
transformed into a myth of its own by enabling the logic of this process of control to permeate every 
part of life. 
 The new mythology is that of reason and it appears to replace classical mythology, 
understood as superstitious and magical, with a scientific one that is ostensibly more open, self-
reflexive, and logical. There is no room for complex temporal and power-laden relationships, let 
alone personal failings, such as those found in the dialectical realm of tragedy. The mythology of 
reason is based on what Horkheimer has called traditional science, a form of knowledge that 
“arrives at causal explanation that forms part of a system of universal propositions” on “the basis of 
empirical observation.”66 Through revision and deduction, the universal propositions form an ever-
expanding network of knowledge that covers all human and natural life. The ideal of deduction is 
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the mathematical calculation echoed in modern bourgeois society, which Horkheimer and Adorno 
consider to be “ruled by equivalence” (4). 
 Enlightenment makes particular things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities, 
since modern scientific rationality does not recognize specific representation: “For the 
Enlightenment, anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is 
illusion; modern positivism consigns it to poetry” (4–5). Poetry, which here can stand for art in 
general, is associated with what is excluded from the domain of proper science. This equates the 
relationship between science and art with that between mythology and the principle of mana. It also 
hints at the “peculiar, mysterious, and even dangerous” nature of the aesthetic, which tragedy 
utilizes by putting societal horrors into public display.67 According to this view, life in modernity is 
fragmented and our traditional theoretical means to understand it⎯and by extension the world⎯are 
essentially limited. To make sense of the wrong life that cannot be lived rightly, we need to 
supplement our logical reasoning with the aesthetic apprehension of our catastrophic predicament.68 
 Through their theory of reification, Horkheimer and Adorno connect their critique of 
positivism with Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Theirs is an attempt to show the ideological 
underpinnings of modern science that seeks to present itself as value-free, as abstract and neutral. 
Marx had argued that exchange requires imposing an imaginary equivalence on materially different 
objects.69 In a society that organizes its economy around exchange, the process in which the 
particular use-value of things is replaced with a universal exchange value comes to dominate 
people’s consciousness: “Not merely are qualities dissolved in thought, but human beings are forced 
into real conformity” (9). This leads us to misrepresent things in ways that inadvertently reinforce 
the existing social order and then take this representation for reality, thereby making relations 
between human beings similar to those between things.70 In other words, the principle of exchange 
describes everything as identical with everything else, paralleling the way positivism sees 
everything in terms of the mathematical model. Capitalism and science, exchange and abstraction, 
are complementary, cementing the ideological organization of society and rendering criticism 
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impossible by monopolizing the discourse on truth, as happened in the Athenian polis. Philosophy 
ends up being complicit in the advancement of capitalist ideology by resigning itself to interpreting 
the world and inadvertently covering up the tragic nature of reality. Although all the possibilities to 
realize a rationally organized change for the better have been exhausted, we are still morally obliged 
to resist this ideology by pointing out its contradictions and excesses.71 This can only be done 
through discourses that resist capitalist appropriation, such as critical philosophy and autonomous 
art, which complement each other in both revealing the ideological underpinnings of thought and 
expression.72 
 And this is as far as Adorno believes we can go, for we are no longer capable of articulating 
positive alternatives for our current condition. According to his negativist view on ethics, we cannot 
know what the good life entails or how a just society should be organized. The only understanding 
we can obtain from the right life is by experiencing the wrong one. That is, while we can recognize 
bad things and feel duty-bound to prevent them from happening, we are unable to define or depict 
good things. In our current condition, it would make little sense even were we able to define the 
good things by envisioning alternatives, since the tools we have for their assessment are always 
already ideologically compromised. In terms of moral philosophy, the problem is how to combine 
an intuitive aesthetic truth with the corrupt conceptional rationality into a motivating ethical theory. 
Adorno’s solution is, on the one hand, to envision a mode of dialectical thinking that remains aware 
of the limits of conceptual thought—which are revealed through aesthetic experiences that 
communicate the non-conceptual--but strives to overcome them.73 On the other hand, he presents us 
with a thoroughly negativist moral view that is summed up by the encouragement to “live less 
wrongly.”74 
 This is well in line with the tragic view of morality found in classical Athenian drama. There 
are no--and can never be any--tragic ethical imperatives, because the consequences of actions 
cannot be fully anticipated. This does not mean that anything is permitted, but that we are 
responsible beyond our immediate sphere of influence. This is illustrated in a number of tragedies 
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through the cycle of violence that turns the sins of fathers, and sometimes grandfathers, into those 
of the sons. In this way our moral incentive clashes with our inability to make sense of the world 
and thereby of our own actions. This emphasizes the split between the actor, who has the moral 
demand imposed upon her, and the world, the context and object of the action. Later in his career, 
Adorno uses Hamlet, a paradigmatic modern tragedy, to illustrate this predicament in which we are 
obliged to act but cannot.75 As is well known, Hamlet feels obliged to take revenge for the murder 
of his father by his uncle, but keeps coming up with excuses not to carry out the act. When he 
eventually does murder his uncle, amid homicidal and suicidal mayhem, he seems to do so in spite 
of rational thought, not as a consequence of it.76 Adorno’s analysis of “the Hamlet syndrome” 
suggest that the rationalization of society separates us from our will, that is, the impulse that allows 
us to break the cycle of deliberation and enter “the realm of objects” in an act that momentarily 
reconciles reason and nature.77 Since this reconciliation brings death and violence, the play is an 
excellent metaphor for, to quote Ross Wilson, “the precariousness of a world with the potential 
either to establish peace and security for all its inhabitants, or to slide at any moment into 
unimaginable horror.”78 In order to avoid the horror, Adorno formulates the ultimate moral 
guideline for human beings as a categorical demand “to arrange their thoughts and actions so that 
Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen.”79 And this has to be done in a 
way that acknowledges the limitations of reason and thereby of the only critical tools we have at our 
disposal. It also reminds us of the conceptual shift of modernity which displaced the locus of horror 
from nature to society. 
 This brings us back to the theme of the tragedy of enlightenment. As we have seen, 
Horkheimer and Adorno remind us that the autonomy of strong, enlightened subjects is an illusion, 
hypostasized as it is on the denial of our ties to nature. Modernity has been ideologically 
constructed as an abstract ahistorical context that legitimizes the actions, both malevolent and 
benevolent, of purportedly modern individuals, who are conceived of as their own masters, fully in 
charge of their own destiny and accountable to no one.80 This “enlightened” view obscures the fact 
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that our history consists of a series of catastrophes that we have brought about.81 Given that 
according to Adorno, Hamlet reveals the tragic nature of the modern situation, it seems difficult, if 
not impossible, to think of a way to change the world without inflicting suffering on people and 
nature. It is unlikely that Adorno would have found the postwar generations, such as ours, as having 
managed to organize their thoughts and actions according to his moral imperative.82 
 In order to follow Adorno’s moral imperative, we need to act in a way that reconciles reason 
and nature without direct recourse to or eventual regression to violence. This, again, is the kind of 
conundrum tragedies tend to depict. They present us with a picture of an unjust reality within which 
actions have unintended consequences, where actors find it difficult, if not impossible, to pursue 
moral goals without perishing in the attempt. “In tragic drama,” Karoline Gritzner writes, “the 
particular gestures of the individual subject become ethical claims in a universe of contradiction and 
injustice.”83 A central philosophical quality of tragedy is the possibility to tarry with ethical 
questions without expecting a final ethical solution, which is one of the reasons Plato found 
tragedies so dangerous.84 They show the world, be it social or natural, to be either hostile or 
indifferent to human aspirations and reveals weaknesses and faults in humans and the reality they 
inhabit. The persistent theoretical and aesthetic interest in tragedies shows the importance of this 
peculiar kind of negativism for our attempt to make sense of the human condition.85 And as we have 
seen, Horkheimer and Adorno clearly share this interest with the tragedians. 
 
Adorno on Tragedy 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s tragic view of the human condition is a central feature of the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. It is therefore somewhat surprising that Adorno never dealt with tragedy or the 
tragic in a sustained way. The subject nonetheless seems to have preoccupied him at different stages 
of his writing career, as testified by his numerous remarks scattered throughout his work. The 
question of tragic art gained special importance in the works of Adorno’s fellow Marxists, Georg 
Lukács and Bertolt Brecht, yet even then Adorno’s criticism remained somewhat opaque and he did 
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not consider the possibility and implications of holding a tragic view beyond the realm of the 
aesthetic.86 
The most illuminating of Adorno’s comments on tragedy and the tragic are found in his 
Aesthetic Theory. While the comments are critical, they are by no means dismissive.87 On the one 
hand, Attic tragedy is mentioned as the possible origin of the idea of aesthetic autonomy, a notion 
Adorno held in high esteem.88 On the other hand, he finds classical tragedy redundant. Even if it 
dealt with societal and cultural themes in a critical manner, it was thoroughly embedded in the 
society and culture that enabled it.89 According to Adorno, no form of art has universal validity, and 
Attic tragedy cannot therefore be squarely transported to our present situation.90 Additionally, he 
believes that the best social criticism art can provide is through works that do not explicitly commit 
to criticism or to any other cause external to art, a view he repeats in a number of places throughout 
his work.91 
 In his criticism, Adorno distinguishes between tragedy as a form and the subject matter of 
particular plays, seeing the relevance of the form as dependent on a work’s social truth content.92 
Notably, the truth content is not dependent on the subject matter of the artwork. This means that the 
phenomenon of tragic art is constituted in and through a dialectic of its individual elements: the 
tragic form, the tragic subject matter, and the social truth content. Each one of the elements 
constitutes a part of its own historical trajectory and is shaped within a specific historical situation 
from which it cannot be removed without being abstracted and generalized into an ahistorical 
idea.93 In other words, tragedy as a form is no longer possible, even though the tragic content of 
“evil and death” endures.94 The subject matter of classical tragedies can no longer communicate a 
truth relevant to the modern social situation. 
 Adorno can therefore be negatively positioned along a line of thinkers who have argued that 
the tragic is something that can be extrapolated from the ancient tragedies and is therefore separate 
from them.95 While proponents of such a view tend to consider tragedies as having historical value 
only, insofar as they cannot reveal the truth about modern times, they may still consider the tragic 
20 
 
as a category that deals with our attitudes to fundamental aspects of the given: death and suffering. 
These aspects remain crucial to our existence and a critical response to them is vital for our cultural 
self-understanding if we are to forge a more ethical society from which unnecessary suffering is 
eradicated.96 To quote Adorno: 
 
 All that by which aesthetic pedants once zealously distinguished the tragic from the 
 mournful—the affirmation of death, the idea that the infinite glimmers through the demise 
 of the finite, the meaning of suffering—all this now returns to pass judgment on tragedy.  
 Wholly negative artworks now parody the tragic. Rather than being tragic, all art is 
 mournful, especially those works that appear cheerful and harmonious.97 
  
Any hint of a hidden meaning beyond the chaos of everyday life risks giving us a false glimmer of 
hope.98 Works of art have to somehow point beyond the level of ideological representation lest they 
affirm the ideologically constructed status quo.99 Since death and suffering are an inevitable part of 
the human condition, we have every reason to retain a tragic sensibility, which can only be done by 
understanding the tragic in terms that do not impose upon it a concealed meaning in the sense of 
redemption or closure.100 In order to save the tragic from the limits set to it by a redundant dramatic 
form, we must find the modern locus of the tragic outside the traditional forms of tragic art.101 I 
believe Adorno finds this locus in autonomous art and, most importantly, in philosophy.102 
 In conclusion, the analysis of the tragic sense of negative dialectics in relation tragedy as an 
art form enables us to see Adorno’s philosophy as a part of a rich tradition of critical thinking that 
has sought to bridge the gap between philosophy and literature and has shed light on the rifts that 
constitute modernity while informing our cultural self-understanding. This tradition helps us 
understand the political implications of our ethical predicament by exposing the web of relations 
that forms our subjectivity and distances us from our natural human selves. Since his preoccupation 
with tragedy and the tragic recurs throughout his mature philosophy, the approach presented in this 
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article may serve as a model for a more detailed mapping and examination of the tragic dimension 
of Adorno’s thought. 
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in the text. Gandesha has mapped these in his “Enlightenment as Tragedy: Reflections on Adorno’s 
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Enlightenment: Athenian Political Thought and the Dilemmas of Modernity (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1997). Horkheimer’s, and by the same token the Frankfurt School’s, animosity 
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Tragic Knowledge,” in Handbook of Critical Theory, ed. David M. Rasmussen (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999), 57–73.  
2 The distinction between tragedy and the attribute called ‘the tragic’ is constitutive of our modern 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. Tragedy is generally considered to refer to both the 
dramatic form and its individual manifestations, especially in the classical Greek plays, while the 
tragic signifies a philosophical dimension that is extrapolated from the tragedies and the vast 
 
                                                
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
theoretical corpus inspired by them. See Vassilis Lambropoulos, The Tragic Idea (London: Bristol 
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4 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 163–65. 
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Enlightenment and treat it as part of Adorno’s oeuvre. Themes found in the book are also touched 
upon in the work of both Horkheimer and Adorno written at the time of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment’s initial publication, making it difficult and in my view pointless to try to trace the 
origin of any of the views presented in the book to either one of the authors. See Max Horkheimer, 
Eclipse of Reason (New York: Continuum, 1974), and Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: 
Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. Edmund Jephcott (London: Verso, 2004). 
6 Whether Hamlet is a tragedy is an intricate question. Even those who, for whatever reason, think it 
is not, often choose to discuss it when they discuss tragedies. See, for example, George Steiner, The 
Death of Tragedy (New York: Hill & Wang, 1963). 
7 The view can be found incorporated into the thought of many modern thinkers. This is notably the 
case with Freud, who, together with Nietzsche, was one of Adorno’s key influences. See especially 
chapter 2 of Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. David McLintock (London: 
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8 See Gandesha, “Enlightenment as Tragedy.” 
9 Unsystematic and seemingly irrational in the sense that the results of rituals remain unpredictable. 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, 
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of the play’s action, justice itself shifts, twists, and is transformed into its contrary? 
20 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, 25: “In the new framework of 
tragic interplay, then, the hero has ceased to be a model. He has become, both for himself and for 
others, a problem.” 
21 Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory, 176. 
22 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, 24. 
23 Aristotle famously claims in his Poetics that tragedies arouse fear (phobos) and pity (eleos). See 
Aristotle, Poetics, in Classical Literary Criticism, ed. Dawn A. Russell and Michael Winterbottom, 
trans. M. E. Hubbard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 66. The pity he refers to is a very 
specific kind of “amorphous fellow-feeling,” as Gloria Fisk calls it, which occurs between equals. 
Paraphrasing Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, she continues that tragedy functioned to remind the 
citizen-spectators that they are equally susceptible to misfortune, a notion having to do with the 
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